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Fordham: The West Virginia Municipal Home Rule Proposal

THE WEST VIRGINIA MUNICIPAL HOME RULE
PROPOSAL
II. Analysis of thte Proposal
JFF

B. FORDHAM

In the first instalment of this paper, which appeared in the
last issue of the Quarterly, it was sought to present an outline
picture of the legal position of municipalities in West Virginia's
governmental system upon a background of appropriate historical
materials. The immediate purpose is to consider the home rule
proposal which has appeared on the scene so depicted.
On December 1, 1930 the Constitutional Commission appointed by the Governor of West Virginia, in pursuance of a joint
resolution of the Legislature, for the purpose of studying the Constitution of the state with a view to suggesting changes required
to bring that document up to date, filed its very able report.
Among the more interesting recommendations of the Commission
was the following municipal home rule amendment,' a consideration of the merits of which has provoked this discussion:
"No local or special law shall hereafter be passed incorating cities, towns or villages, or amending their charters.
The Legislature shall provide by general laws for the incorporation and government of cities, towns and villages and
shall classify such municipal corporations, upon the basis of
population, into not less than three nor more than five classes.
Such general laws shall restrict the powers of such cities,
towns and villages to borrow money and contract debts, and
shall limit the rate of taxes for municipal purposes. Under
such general laws, the electors of each municipal corporation,
wherein the population exceeds five thousand, shall have
power and authority to frame, adopt and amend the charter
of such corporation, or to amend an existing charter thereof,
and through its legal constituted authority, may pass all laws
and ordinances relating to its municipal affairs, provided
that any such charter or amendment thereto, and any such law
or ordinance so adopted, shall be invalid and void if inconsistent or in conflict with this Constitution or the general
laws of the State then in effect, or thereafter from time to
time enacted."
For a general account of the work and recommendations of the Commission
see White, The Amendments Proposed 'bythe West Virginia Constitutional
Commission (1931) 38 W. VA. L. Q. 1.
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I
Some consideration should be given to the general design of
the amendment before attempting to analyze it in detail. Is the
scheme directed toward establishing a realm of municipal
autonomy independent of legislative control? Is the purpose simply to do away with the special legislative chartering of municipalities? Or is it sought also to give cities a measure of self-government subject to the control of the legislature through laws of
general application? The report of the Commission does not render the matter clear. The explanatory statement that "city charters would no longer be amended by the Legislature but would be
amended by the local communities in accordance with general law,
thus eliminating much special legislation and the evils incident
thereto" seems to point to the third suggested purpose.
Looking objectively to the language used it is clear that
special legislative chartering of cities is forbidden. It is clear,
moreover, that complete freedom from legislative control is not
contemplated. The amendment is not self-executing. Chartermaking powers are to be exercised under "general laws" classifying municipalities for purposes of incorporation and government.
If a city is dependent upon the legislature to render available
through general laws both the machinery of home rule and the
content of home rule powers then no positive measure of independence from legislative control is given. And that seems to be
the effect of the proposal. This view is supported by two considerations. The fact that general laws are to be enacted providing for the "government" as well as the "incorporation" of cities
is persuasive since "government" may be taken to include both
the framework and powers of a governmental unit. Conceivably
it could be urged that this was intended to apply only to cities
which did not adopt home rule. But there is no express warrant
for the distinction. In fact, it is expressly provided that chartermaking powers, at least, be exercised under the general laws as
to incorporation and government.
The second consideration is the requirement that the charter
and ordinances of a home rule city be consistent with the Constitution and "general laws" of the State, present and future.
What is meant by "general laws"? As used in the first part of
the proposal the phrase referred to the form and operative effect
of statutes rather than the nature of their subject matter since
it was used in contradistinction to "local or special laws". As
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used in the restriction it does not appear but that the same connotation was employed. True, a city is authorized to "pass all
laws and ordinances relating to its municipal affairs", but that
authorization is subject to the restriction just stated. At best,
ordinances relating to "municipal affairs" would be valid and
effective without express statutory extension of power until the
field were occupied by an inconsistent statute.
This interpretation is supported by the judicial construction
of the Michigan amendment,' which the West Virginia proposal
follows in substance. The Supreme Court of Michigan has gone
to the point of deciding that home rule powers must first be made
available by statute. Thus it was held that Detroit for want of
express legislative delegation of the power could not resort to
zoning.' Moreover, the Legislature of Michigan, though acting
promptly and liberally in extending home rule powers," has
operated from the start on the theory that it had authority to determine what must and might be included in and what must be
excluded from a home rule charter. '
If the above interpretation is sound the proposed amendment
would effect at best only one object which could not be attained
without constitutional changes. No constitutional amendment is
required to end special chartering, so far as the power of the
legislature is concerned. In the absence of constitutional limitation the power of the legislature with respect to municipal charters is plenary.'
There being no limitation requiring special
legislative chartering the legislature could repeal all special charters and set up a system of incorporation under general law."
'Constitution of Mich., art. 8, §§ 20-25. The West Virginia proposal follows sections 20 and 21 but does not make any reference to specific powers of
home rule cities whereas the remaining sections of the Michigan amendment
set out many specific powers that home rule cities shall have and impose
specific limitations on municipal action. The Michigan amendment and

enabling act are discussed in McBAIN, THE LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF
MUNICIPAL HOME RULE (1916) c. 16, pp. 604-620; Bromage, What Municipal
Home Rule Means Today. III. Michigan (1932) 21 NAT. MUN. REv. 176;

Jacobson, Charter Amending Powers of Cities Under Michigan Home Rule
Legislation (1916) 14 MICH. L. REv. 281.
0Clements v. McCabe, 210 Mich. 207) 177 N. W. 722 (1920). The Enabling
Act was so amended the following year as to authorize zoning. See Damley
v. Ingham, 242 Mich. 247, 218 N. W. 766 (1928).
"Pub. Acts of Mich., 1909, No. 279.
"See Jacobson, op. cit. supra n. 39.
3Booten v. Pinson, 77 W. Va. 412, 89 S. E. 985 (1915). See the disucussion
concerning the asserted inherent right to local self-government in the first
instalment of this paper. 38 W. VA. L. Q. 235, 243-245.
" The Constitution of West Virginia, art. 6, § 39, par. 8, simply forbids
special chartering of municipalities under 2,000 and has no further effect.
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As a practical matter, of course, no one is naive enough to expect
the legislature to take this step and thus the proposed prohibition
upon special chartering is necessary to effect the purpose. Likewise the legislature now has power to control the rate of municipal taxes by general law and may regulate municipal indebtedness within the limit now fixed by the Constitution." Whether
the courts would uphold a statute delegating the charter-making
power, however, is open to doubt. Such a measure goes a step
beyond the well-recognized local option idea' in the degree of
power delegated, if not in principle. The idea has been tried in
other states. The courts are in discord concerning the validity of
the delegation." On the merits, the constitutional objection seems
unsound.
Whatever be the present powers of the legislature it
is obvious that the mandate of the proposed amendment would be
calculated to impel action that would not otherwise be taken.
Thus, as a practical matter, abolition of special chartering and the
granting of some measure of home rule require a constitutional
amendment. If the notion that the amendment provides for legislative home rule, that is, home rule subject to the control of the
legislature, is acceptable, it remains to examine the probable effect of it in detail.
Incorporation of Municipalities by General Law
It was concluded in the first instalment of this paper that
special chartering has been a distinct failure and should be abolished. Doubtless that failure was the chief reason for the home
rule proposal. In any event the chartering of municipal corporations by special act would be entirely abolished and provision made
for the "incorporation and government" of cities, towns and villages by general law, which would divide them for the purpose
into from three to five classes based on population. Thus the prohibition against future special chartering is clear enough. Other
matters are left more obscure, however.
After the legislature shall have acted in pursuance of the
'8The limit is five per cent. of the assessed value of the taxable property
within a city. Constitution of West Va., art. 10, § 8.
""With respect to the use of the device in charter-making see generally
MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION (2d ed. 1928) § 149.
47The cases are cited and discussed by McBain, The Delegation of Legislative Power to Cities (1917) 32 PoL. So. Q. 276, 391, 405-409.
48Tlhere is no express coiistitutional limitation and actual charter-makling
is just one step removed from optional charter privileges under general law.
This was Professor MeBain's conclusion, McBain, op. cit. su ra n, 47, 410411.
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amendment would existing special charters still stand? It seems
that they would continue since the prohibition on special chartering is prospective. Moreover, it is provided that under the general laws extending home rule a city may amend an existing charter. In Michigan the original amendment was held not to permit
the amending of existing special charters4" but was subsequently
changed to authorize such action.' This means that none of the
special charter municipalities in West Virginia (which include
all with populations exceeding 2,000) would be compelled to organize under the general law unless the legislature expressly repealed
all special charters. It is doubtful that the authorization to home
rule cities to amend existing charters would be an implied limitation on the legislature's power to repeal by general law since the
reference is probably to existence as of the time the amendment
is made.'
Might the legislature make provision by general law for the
incorporation of cities previously operating under special charters
which did not desire home rule? An affirmative answer as to communities under 5,000, the minimum home rule population, is clearly required since the legislature is expressly commanded to provide for incorporation by general law and municipalities under
5,000 would be ineligible for home rule. It is not likely that cities
of over 5,000 would prefer simple incorporation under general
law without home rule both to keeping special charters with power
to amend and to the home rule power to adopt a new charter.
gowever, the power would probably exist to provide for whatever
demand of this sort there might be. If this were not so home
rule would be compulsory with respect to changes from or in existing charters and there is nothing in the proposal to suggest
compulsion. Thus a city above 5,000 might retain its special charter with power to amend, adopt a home rule charter or shift to
incorporation under general law.
The wisdom of permitting a city to amend an existing special
charter has been questioned. Professor MeBain has expressed
the view that the power is undesirable because it merely shifts the
"0Attorney-General ex rel. Vernor v. Common Council of the City of Detroit,
168 Mich. 249, 133 N. W. 1090 (1912).
The provision as amended is Constitution of Mfich. art. 8, § 21.
41The point is largely academic, however, since under even a fairly liberal
enabling act a city could adopt the substance of an old special charter as a
home-rule charter. Certainly it was not intended that the legislature have
power to repeal a special charter after it had once been amended by a city.
It could, of course, amend the enabling act.
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seat of the "tinkering" which tends to render a charter a disorganized hodge-podge" This criticism, however, applies to the
amendment of home rule charters since, according to his view,
piece-meal amendment by any authority may in time put a charter
in an imbroglionic state. But to limit amendment to general revision would render amending too difficult. Moreover, it is not
perceived that a specific provision requiring periodic revision
would be effective because there would be no way to enforce it.
The matter is one which with respect to home rule charters, at
least, must be left to the good sense of the given community. A
prohibition upon amending special charters would be more
practicable. Even there, however, a city could go through the
form of adopting its old special charter as a home rule product.
The common device of classifying cities according to population is convenient and bears some relation to the factual differences
that make for differences in the organization and powers of municipal corporations. There would be no need for extensive classification in West Virginia. Since the proposal makes communities
under 5,000 ineligible for home rule, they would probably be put
in a separate class and properly so. It is doubtful, however, that
the population requirement for home rule should be so low.
Twelve of the twenty-two cities in the state of over 5,000 have
populations of less than 10,000. It is hardly likely that they will
have such peculiar problems of local organization that none of the
stock forms of municipal government which might be made available under general law would meet the situation. And, of course,
the smaller the city the more unhappy the draftsmanship of home
rule charters is likely to be.
It seems that it has always been possible to evade prohibitions
against special chartering. The most used device has been that
of enacting a law general in form but special and local in application. Thus in classifying municipalities by population a class may
be created in which only one city will fall.' This practice was
so overworked in Ohio that the state Supreme Court finally invalidated it. " Under the West Virginia proposal the opportunity
for abuse of the legislative power to classify cities is not offset by
52

McBAIN, op. cit. supra n. 39, 616-618.
53Such statutes are usually upheld. See State ez rel. City of Virginia v.
County Board of St. Louis County, 124 Minn. 126, 144 N. W. 756 (1913);
Eckerson v. Des Moines, 137 Ia. 542, 115 N. W. 177 (1908).
r4 State ex rel. Knisley v. Jones , 66 Ohio 1t, 453, 64 N, B, 424 (1902).
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the availability of constitutional home rule powers. Experience
suggests, however, that the likelihood of abuse is not significant.
The Machinery of Home Rule
As previously intimated the home rule proposal would not
be self-executing.
In some states the amendment provides the
method by which home rule powers are to be exercised! but the
West Virginia proposal would leave the matter entirely to the
legislature. This involves both the advantage of flexibility and
the disadvantage of reliance upon the legislature. The Constitutional Commission seems to have been committed to the theory
that a constitution should contain only fundamentals leaving detail to legislative action.' That point of view is sound as a working thesis but is capable of over-emphasis as well as neglect. But
it would avail little to imbed the machinery of home rule into the
Constitution unless its substantive content was also marked out
there.
Although it is clear that a city could not exercise chartermaking power until the legislature had provided appropriate machinery could it exercise the law-making powers granted by the
amendment without first having adopted a charter?
Common
sense supports an affirmative answer.' This view, moreover, is
sustained by the fact that the charter making power may be exercised simply by amending existing special charters.
The answer to the question whether the grant of law-making
power must be rendered available by general law is deeper in the
shadow. The writer cannot satisfy himself that the language used
is subject to convincing interpretation on the point' and speculation would not be profitable. The difficulty lies in the drafting of the proposal. The reader will have observed that it devotes
one long, involved sentence, which constitutes over half its total
length, to the granting of home rule powers.
To obviate at least the more general difficulties of interpretation the proposal might be redrafted in sections and stated in fullvE. g., Constitution of Mo., art. 9, § 16; Constitution of Calif., art. 11, §
8; Constitution of Wash., art. 11, § 10; Constitution of Colo, art. 20, § 4;
Constitution of Okla., art. 18, §§ 3, 4.
See White, op. cit. supra n. 38, 2-3.
The Ohio amendment has been so construed. Village of Perrysburg v.
Ridgway, 1"08 Ohio St. 245, 140 N. E. 595 (1923).
rAs previously indicated the Michigan amendment is construed 'to mean
that law making powers, at least unusual and farreaching ones like zoning,
must be rendered available by the legislature. Clements v. McCabe, supra
n. 40.
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er, more specific language. It is no answer to say that generality
is a desirable quality in a constitutional provision because it leaves
details to that more plastic authority, statutes. Home rule provisions are inclined to be so general that the making of constitutional law is left, to an abnormal extent, to the courts. Generality,
moreover, does not necessarily mean flexibility; it may well simply mean uncertainty till a court has spoken and inflexibility
thereafter.
Limitation by General Law Upon Muncipal Indebtedness and
Taxation
West Virginia now had a constitutional provision limiting
municipal indebtedness to five per cent. of the assessed value of
the taxable property within a city." The legislature has regulated
the subject within the range of the maximum limit.' Under the
proposed amendment the legislature would be required "to restrict the powers of such cities, towns and villages to borrow money
and contract debts and shall limit the rate of taxes for municipal
purposes" by general laws. No reference is made to existing restrictions. It may be possible to reconcile the proposal with the
existing constitutional provision" but careful drafting requires
that they be expressly harmonized. If it be desirable to render
the maximum debt limit more flexible by placing the matter in the
hands of the legislature there is all the more reason for redrafting this part of the proposal.
It is rather generally considered salutary to provide some
measure of supervision of local fiscal matters by state authorities.
The idea is, infact, already being exploited in West Virginia.
Municipal accounts are audited under the direction of the State
Tax Commissioner.' There is no reason why the practise should
not be continued under a home rule system.'
The power to tax is conceived to be a legislative power with
which the legislature may endow municipal corporations.
In
West Virginia the Constitution expressly authorizes the legislature to empower municipal corporations to assess and collect taxes
" Art. 10, § 8.
10W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 13, art. 1, § 3.
"Thus, conceivably, by construing the two provisions together, the proposal
might be said to be a mandate to the legislature to regulatd the subject within
the present maximum limit.
1W.
VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 6, art. 9, § 5.
"The Ohio amendment specifically authorizes statutory provision for the
practise. Constitution of Ohio, art. 18, § 13.
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for "corporate purposes"," but is silent with respect to the tax
rate. The legislature, however, has acted upon the subject by
limiting the rates of taxes of local governmental units generally.'
The reference in the proposal and in the statute is, of course, to
the general property tax which is the chief source of revenue for
municipalities as well as counties and school districts. So long
as the general property tax remains an important source of
revenue for local units of government which may overlap, it is
obvious that the legislature should continue to have power to coordinate and control their several tax rates. It is believed that
investigation will reveal an unnecessary duplication in local governmental machinery the correcting of which would bring about
a revision in the general property tax.
If the legislature proved liberal in extending home rule
powers cities might resort to other forms of taxes not expressly
denied them by statute or otherwise inconsistent therewith.' The
necessity, however, for ultimate legislative control over tax matters to effect an equitable distribution of the tax burden on the
one hand and of the benefit on the other is manifest.
The Grant of Home Rule
The central problem of home rule from the standpoints both
of draftsmanship and of the practical functioning of local administration has been the distribution of powers between local
and state agencies. The reader will recall the suggestion that the
West Virginia proposal would not set up constitutional home rule.
It would simply shift the problem of distribution of powers to the
legislature. Thus it would be for the legislature to indicate what
might, must and must not be included in a home rule charter.
Doubtless that body would in good faith leave free rein as to the
form of municipal government but be more specific as to the powers
thereof.' But there is nothing in the proposal to preclude the
enactment of an enabling act regulating in detail the very form of
government available to home rule cities.
Even though it were decided that the law-making power was
04

Art. 10, § 9.
VA. RLv. COD (1931) c. 11, art. 8.
0 Thus in Minnesota a charter provision for a wheelage tax not authorized
by statute was upheld. Park v. City of Duluth, 134 Minn. 296, 159 N. W. 627
CW.

(1916).
07The Michigan Enabling Act, however, went so far as to prescribe certain
officers which every home rule city must have. Pub. Acts of Mich., 1909,
No. 279.
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available without the aid of an enabling act a city could exercise
the power freely only where the field was not already occupied by
statute. Insofar as an applicable statute existed ordinances would
have to conform thereto no matter how local the subject matter.
That appears to be the effect of the proviso of the proposal voiding charter provisions and ordinances in conflict with "the general laws of the State". The legislature could dispose of this
limitation when desired by expressly providing in a statute that
it should be inapplicable to home rule cities. This could be done,
of course, only with respect to matters appropriate for municipal
action.
2
The discussion thus far involves an attempt to interpret the
proposal along broad lines in order to indicate its general effect.
The writer is not satisfied that the views expressed are watertight. The language of the proposal is too obscure for a commentator to be sure of his ground. That is one justification for
considering another line of interpretation. It will afford a basis,
moreover, for appraising in part the home rule experience of
other states.
Conceivably the proposal may be taken to apportion governmental powers between the central government of the state and its
municipalities according to whether a given matter is a local or
general concern. Under this view the legislature would have the
function of providing the machinery but not the content of home
rule by general law. Insofar as a city in charter-making or legislating remained within the limits of "municipal affairs" its actions
would be paramount and would prevail over conflicting statutes.'
The most significant difference between the amendment as so
conceived and the first suggested interpretation is that as a practical matter under the former the problem of gradually marking
out the content of home rule would devolve directly upon the
courts whereas under the latter the determination would be primarily, at least, for the legislature."
One does not require an
account of the judicial experience with the former view to appreciate difficulties it presents. Apportionment of governmental
powers on the basis of a distinction between general and local concerns sets up a standard at once so vague and artificial that its
This is the situation in California, Oklahoma and Texas, for example.
The legislature, of course, could by a very general and liberal enabling
act shift the problem at once to the courts.
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application involves an abnormally large area of doubt. Little
wonder Judge McFarland of the California Supreme Court was
moved to say concerning the California amendment: "The section
of the constitution in question uses the loose, indefinable, wild
words municipal affairs, and imposes upon the court the almost
impossible duty of saying what they mean.""
An examination of the cases will indicate the force of Judge
McFarland's observation. That exercise, moreover, has relevancy
to the West Virginia proposal for, though it be construed to render home rule entirely a matter of legislative delegation, the legislature might make a full unqualified extension of home rule powers
the exercise of which would present many judicial problems as to
their "localness". Thus under the Minnesota amendment, the
state legislature gave home rule cities an extensive power over
their frames of government and "municipal functions" as the
legislature could have exercised before the adoption of the amendmnent.' And the requirement of consistency with state law has
been so construed that home rule charters prevail over statutes on
the same subject "except in those cases where the charter contravenes the public policy of the state as declared by general laws,
and in those instances where the legislature expressly declares that
a general law shall prevail" or the purpose appear by implication.' This interpretation gives home rule cities full sway as to
"municipal concerns" so far as the field is not occupied by the
legislature in the manner indicated."
It being impossible to present in a brief way the judicial
material on the application of the home rule concept to all func70x parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 213, 214, 74 Pac. 780, 784 (1903), quoted
in MeBain, op. cit. supra n.39, at 279. And Jones, J., in State ex rel. Toledo
v. Cooper, 97 Ohio St. 86, 91, 119 N. E. 253, 254 (1917) had this to say about
the Ohio amendment:
"Indisputably these provisions are hazy and ambigious, and it is
unfortunate that the members of the constitutional convention did not
more fully define the powers of local self-government committed to
chartered cities, and thus relieve the courts from exercise of wide discretion and from never ending appeals for construction of this constitutional
clause, and likewise relieve the judicial department of the government
from the criticism too often made that it has exercised the power of
framing a Constitution-a power that has been lodged solely in the

people."

n Minn. Laws, 1899, c. 35. See Anderson, Municipal Home .?ule in
Minnesota (1923) 7 MINN. L. REv. 306, 308-313.
"See American Electric Co. v. City of Waseca, 102 Minn. 329, 113 N. W.
899 (1907); Anderson, op. cit. supra n. 71, 322-326.
nWhat constitutes a declaration of the public policy of the state is extremely hazy and, thus, the limitation is largely judicial.
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tions in which cities participate only a few important functions
will be considered here. The inquiry will be limited to utilities,
protection, education, health and sanitation, street control and
local improvements.
Utilities
In several states home rule provisions expressly empower
cities to own and operate utilities.' In New York where there is
no express grant of the power it has been held that a city may
not engage in the business of common carrier by bus." That is,
doubtless, a too narrow view of the matter. Certainly with respect to the bare determination of whether to engage in the business the matter is for the city. The basic power to act might as
readily be left to it. (Legislative power to limit municipal indebtedness could be used to devitalize the power, however, were
its existence conceded)." It has been decided that home rule cities
have power to engage in the businesses of supplying their citizens
with wood and coal,' gasoline" and ice," - services which the
courts are yet unwilling to classify as utilities for purposes of
regulating privately owned and operated enterprizes. The regulation of rates, .however, is usually considered a general concern.'
This means that a home rule city could protect its citizens directly
only by operating utilities itself.' Even then the rates could be
"7Constitution of Mich., art. 8, § 23; Constitution of Ohio, art. 18, § 4.
In Olahoma the Constitution, art. 10, § 27, extends the power to cities goner-

ally apart from home rule.
IBrowne v. City of New York, 241 N. Y. 96, 149 N. E. 211 (1925).
"It is significant, moreover, that aside from the rate-making power the
legislature may eontral the reaping of a profit from municipal utility operations. Thus it has been held that net income from a city water system was
taxation, in effect, and since taxation was legislative in nature a statute
construed to forbid the transfer of any surplus from water departments to
general city accounts was valid and binding. Cincinnati v. Roettinger, 105
Ohio St. 145, 137 N. E. 6 (1922).
Central Lumber Co. v. City of Waseca, 152 Minn. 201, 188 N. W. 275
(1922).
" Standard Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, 114 Neb. 243, 207 N. W. 172 (1926),
aff'd. 275 U. S. 504, 48 S.Ct. 155 (1927).
City of Denton v. Denton Home Ice Co., 27 S.W. (2d) 119 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1930).
State ex rel. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co. v. Latshaw, 30 S.W. (2d) 105
(Mo. 1930). (Holding that rate regulation is a police power of the state that
could not be abridged by a statute authorizing cities to contract as to rates! )
Traverse City v. Railroad Commission, 202 Mich. 575, 168 N. W. 481 (1918).
(Franchise stipulations as to rates were deemed subject to change by the
Railroad Commission under its general power over rates notwithstanding home
rule since rate regulation was a general concern).
aBy general law in West Virginia, W. VA. RBV. CODE (1931) c. 8, art. 4,
§ 10, cities are empowered to prohibit the erection of utility plants. This
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subjected to regulation by the appropriate general state authority.
The West Virginia proposal is silent upon the subject of
utilities as well as upon all other specific forms of municipal
activity. At present a West Virginia city may own and operate
utilities either under special charter or general law.' It may by
contract stipulate rates in granting utility franchisese but a rate
so set is none the less subject to revision by the Public Service
m " This
Commission.
system might be continued under the proposed amendment. The possible superiority from the local standpoint of a system of decentralized control, involving municipal
regulation of rates would hardly be conceded by the utility interests. The choice, of course, would lie in the lap of the legislature.
Protection
While judicial departure from the proposition that control
of a fire department is a local concern is unlikely, the decisions
are in discord with respect to the "localness" of police administration.' By reason of their position as law enforcement officers
engaged in enforcing state as well as local law municipal police
officers have long been considered agents of the state." They are
employed and paid by the city. The actual conduct of police administration is just as appropriately reposed in local hands as any
other branch of municipal activity. There may be sound reasons
for setting up general statutory standards in police service but
the only reasons the writer can discover in support of direct state
power would not extend to the impairment of any existing franchise but could
be used in aid of municipal ownership and operation where no problem of
interfering with a franchise existed.
"The special charter provisions vary, of course, with the given city. The
City of Morgantown, for example, has charter authority I Ito erect, own, control
and maintain, or authorize or prohibit the erection of any waterworks in the
said city or any gas plant, or electric light plant, for light, heat, and power,
or for either of said purposes."
Acts of W. Va., 1921, Municipal Charters,
c. 15, § 18 (a). For the general statute see W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) C. 8,
art. 4, § 10.
3Improvement Co. v. City of Bluefield, 69 W. Va. 1, 70 S. E. 772 (1911).
See also City of St. Mary's v. Hope Gas Co., 71 W. Va. 76, 76 S. E. 841
(1912).
"City of Benwood v. Public Service Commission, 75 W. Va. 127, 83 S. E.
295 (1914).
See Simpson v. Gage, 195 Mich. 581, 161 N. W. 898 (1917).
wCases are collected by McBain, The New York Proposal for Municipal
Home Bule (1922) 37 PoL. So. Q. 655, 677.
6,By statute in West Virginia the mayor and public officers of municipalities are required to assist in enforcing the criminal law of the state. W. VA.
Bzv. CODE (1931) c. 8, art. 4, § 25.
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control of police administration in a city are the patronage requirements of partizan politics.'
Education
Nothing has been more definitely conceded to be a general concern than education. This position was taken in a recent Nebraska decision with respect to the establishment of a municipal university.' The same conclusion led to a decision in Ohio against
the applicability of municipal building regulations to school buildings to be erected within the limits of the city.0 It seems fairly
evident that the test of local or general concern is entirely irrelevant to the problems of public education. But if the matter is
otherwise left open the courts can exploit the general concern notion to advantage in aid of a unified and flexible educational
policy.
West Virginia is definitely committed to a system of state
control of education. A class of independent school districts, set
up under special acts of the legislature in many of the urban communities, has considerable autonomy in administration as distinguished from standards of service but even there the ultimate
control of the legislature is clear. Municipal corporations as such
do not participate in public education. Though a school district
and a municipality exactly coincide territorially they constitute
two distinct corporations."
Special legislation relating to schools and school districts
might well receive the same fate to which the proposed amendment would consign special chartering of cities and for similar
reasons. In other respects, however, the desirability of changes in
the present system should rest in the hands which are continuously shaping educational policy.
Health and Sanitation
Inquiry into the competency of a city to establish health and
sanitary regulations is usually formulated in terms of the police
13The experience of St. Louis strongly supports this conclusion. See Barclay, What Municipal Home Bule Means Today. Y. Missouri (1932) 21 NAT.
MuIN. REV. 312, 316, 317.
Carlberg v. Metcalfe, 120 Neb. 481, 234 N. W. 87 (1930).
0 Niehaus v. State ez rel. Board of Education, 111 Ohio St. 47, 144 N. E.
433 (1924).
91District boards of education are constituted corporations by statute. W.
VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 18, art. 5, § 5. Likewise special acts creating independent school districts give corporate charter to the boards of education.
E. g., Acts of W. Va., 1925, c. 102, § 10.
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power. The extent of the police power of home rule cities is decidedly uncertain; the cases lean toward classifying health and
sanitary measures as general concerns. Thus the reenactment by
New York City of the state multiple-housing law was declared void
because the subject-matter, housing conditions, was not a local
affair.' An Ohio statute divided the state into sanitary districts,
constituted each municipality such a district and required each
city to contribute directly to the expenses called for by the
measure. The Ohio home rule amendment expressly authorizes
municipal sanitary measures "not in conflict with general laws".'
Thus the statute would have been valid in any event but the court
proceeded to declare that it related to matters of general concern."
In Ohio the regulation of hours of work on city public work has
been declared a fit subject for municipal action! but a Tliichigan
decision invalidated charter and ordinance provisions prescribing
maximum hours and minimum wages for all city employes.' The
Michigan court proceeded on the notion that some city employes
were engaged in functions of general concern to arrive at the conclusion that the regulation of their working conditions was a general affair. The decision is a fair indication of the artificiality of
the distinction upon which it was based.
Here again we have a public function as to which the "local
versus general" distinction spells little. Of course, both local and
The problem,
state authorities are interested in the subject.
however, relates to the selection of the most appropriate means
to advance the purpose. Experience in the field suggests that
these functions be performed in large part under the control of
the local authorities. The legislature remains the agency through
which to co6rdinate local administration with state policy and
standards.
Street Control
This branch of municipal activity affords an interesting example of changing conditions forcing a change in the judicial
outlook upon the application of the "local versus general" notion
'Adler v. Deegan, 251 N. Y. 467, 167 N. E. 705 (1929).
13 Constitution of Ohio, art. 18, § 3.
1State ez rel. Village of Cuyahoga Heights v. Zangerle, 103 Ohio St. 566,
134 X. E. 686 (1921). See also Board of Health of City of Canton v. State
ex rel. 0' Wesney, 40 Ohio App. 77, 178 N. E. 215 (1931).
0 Stange v. City of Cleveland, 94 Ohio St. 377, 114 N. E. 261 (1916).
cc Attorney General ex rel. Lennone v. City of Detroit, 225 Mich. 631, 196
N. W. 391 (1923).
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to public functions. In the youth of automobild traffic the use of
automobiles was definitely localized. Inter-city and interstate
traffic cut a very modest figure. It was easy then for a court to
declare traffic control a local affair." It is not so today. The development by Ford and others of cars within the range of modest
buying power made their ownership a commonplace, which, in
turn, has led to the present splendid system of paved highways
and streets. The effect on traffic is too apparent to require
description. It is enough to say that traffic is no longer local and
the courts know it. The recent decisions point definitely to the
view that traffic regulation is to be classed as a general concern.'
This does not mean that home rule cities have no power to
regulate traffic; it means that municipal regulation must be consistent with the state law. It does not apply, moreover, to other
street uses. For the most part that they were "local concerns"
would not be contested."° It has been declared in California,
however, that a municipality operating an electric light service
was subject to a regulation of the State Railroad Commission forbidding the placing of light poles nearer than eight feet to the
center line of a railway since the regulation of utilities was a matter of general interest.' ®
Local Improvements
The Supreme Court of Colorado has declared that an
ordinance providing for the levy and collection of special assessments in aid of street improvements related to a subject "typicalSKalich v. Knapp, 72 Ore. 588, 142 Pac. 594 (1914).
Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, 121 Ohio St. 80, 167 N. E. 158, 64 A. L. R.
981 (1929); Ex parte Daniels, 183 Cal. 636, 192 Pac. 422 (1920). Both of
these cases involved speed regulation. In Ohio regulation of weight of loads
to be hauled over streets had previously been treated as a local matter in
Froelich v. City of Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 N. E. 212 (1919), and
expressly distinguished from speed regulation as a matter of business management and not a safety measure under the police power. The distinction is
nebulous, at best. A much more obviously bad distinction, however, has been
made in holding statutes, constituting driving an automobile while intoxicated
an offense, superior to cohflicting local regulations-a sound enough result.
It is the specious notion that such a statute is not a traffic regualtion but
simply a regulation of personal conduct. See Helmer v. Superior Court, 48
Cal. App. 140, 191 Pac. 1001 (1920); Clayton v. State, 297 Pe. 1037 (Ariz.
1931). The opinion in the former case is significant, however, in its recognition of the idea that change in traffic conditions may convert into a general
what was once a "municipal affair".
"Sunset Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Pasadena, 161 Cal. 265, 188 Pac.
796 (1911) (Control of streets for purpose of granting or denying franchises
to telephone companies was deemed a "municipal affair"').
'0 Sincerney v. Los Angeles, 53 Cal. App. 440, 200 Pac. 380 (1921).
8

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol38/iss4/5

16

Fordham: The West Virginia Municipal Home Rule Proposal
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
ly and pre-eminently of 'local concern' "1' This view is shared
by the courts of Oklahoma1 ' and Mfinnesota,' but was rejected in
Ohio.'
What are the merits of the problem with respect to street
construction and maintenance, for example? The service is one
customarily subsidized in part by general taxation and in part by
special assessment. The people most benefitted pay the largest
share; the citizens, who come next in benefit, contribute the balance. The general public of the state receive a more remote benefit and pay nothing. Experience in the field points to no better
way to pay for the service. Yet the function cannot accurately
be classified as essentially local. There is a general interest in
having a safe and adequate system of streets and highways
throughout the state. This interest may find expression in efforts
to pull backward communities up to the higher level. And thus
there would be some warrant for statutes setting up standards
without interfering with local freedom in administration. Congress had made strides in improving highways in states backward
in road building through the indirect device of "federal aid".'
The legislature, unless precluded by the "local concern" notion,
could impose standards as to streets directly.
The dissatisfaction with "localness" as a measure of home
rule powers, which the writer has expressed,1 is nothing more or
less than an objection to the stock home rule concept. It relates
primarily to constitutional home rule, which sets up a realm of
complete freedom from legislative control in "municipal affairs".
But it has some application to the West Virginia proposal even
when viewed as a provision for legislative home rule since the
maximum range of the law-making power of a city acting under
it would be the outer boundary of "municipal affairs". The notion is not, of course, essential to a grant of substantial municipal
autonomy. The constitutional provision might be framed to specify rather fully the powers and functions of municipalities. That
device, however, would be open to the objection of inflexibility,
"'Board of Com'rs. of El Paso County v. City of Colorado Springs, 66
Colo. 111, 180 Pac. 301 (1919).
"Berry v. McCormick, 91 Okla. 211, 217 Pac. 392 (1923).
"' The Iinnesota cases are collected in Anderson, op. cit. supra n. 71, at 312.
10, Berry v. City of Columbus, 104 Ohio St. 607, 136 N. E. 824 (1922).
McD0xALD, FEDERAL AiD (1930). See c. 5. esp.
0 For further material upon the unhappy judicial experience with the
"'localness" notion see Professor McBain's discussion of the California cases.
McBAmn, op. cit. supra n. 39, chaps. 8-10.
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which lies against constitutional home rule generally. What is
conceived to be a more desirable solution is legislative home rule
under a constitutional amendment directing the legislature to
extend the charter-making power to cities and leaving it entirely
to the legislature to mark out the substantive content of home
rule. The minimum response by the legislature would involve
something about equal to ordinary incorporation under general
law. But there is little likelihood that it would act in bad faith.
The West Virginia proposal, we have concluded, would probably provide for legislative home rule. So it is not open to the
objection that it would saddle upon the state a vague constitutional division of governmental powers between the state government
and municipalities. Insofar as it applies the "localness" concept of home rule to the law-making power it is not acceptable
and the objection might be removed in redrafting the whole pror
posal, which, it is believed, is in order.
3
Undoubtedly the drafting of a home rule amendment is an
extremely difficult undertaking. Only a relatively certain and
smooth-working formulation is attainable. Nevertheless the West
Virginia proposal could be improved in this regard. The specific
difficulties in interpretation which have been discussed could surely be met in part. To this end the suggestion that the amendment
be framed in sections may be reiterated. Thus one section might
be devoted to abolishing special chartering, another to the matter
of providing by general law for incorporation of municipalities
not within the home rule class or not electing to exercise chartermaking powers, a third to providing for legislation rendering home
rule available and to indicating broadly the relation of the provision to the system of incorporation under general law, and so on.
Some elaboration of statement would be desirable.
Thus the
doubt as to tile meaning of "general laws" as used in the proviso
requiring consistency with general laws could be ironed out. The
provision with respect to limiting municipal indebtedness, moreover, should either be expressly harmonized with the present constitutional provision or omitted.
In the drafting of the present proposal one can readily see
'that the draftsman has made use of the constitutional material of
other states. The writer does not know, however, to what extent
the judicial experience with home rule in other states has been
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consulted. It is believed, in any event, that the home rule decisions are the most significant comparative legal materials in home
rule drafting because they bring to light the virtues and defects
of home rule amendments in operation.
Conclusion
The writer makes no claim to have spoken with finality upon
his subject. What has been said is offered chiefly as a means of
airing an important and difficult problem and suggesting an attitude in dealing with it. Something by way of summary, however, may be warranted. The writer believes:
1. Special legislative chartering of municipal corporations in
West Virginia has been expensive, a thief of legislative time and
a negative influence in shaping governmental development.
It
ought, therefore, to be abolished.
2. Incorporation under general law for all cities would be
preferable to the present system. In fact, that system with the
common feature, optional charter privileges, would probably best
suit the peculiar needs of the state.
3. There is neither a strong demand nor a conspicuous need
for any form of municipal home rule in West Virginia.
a. Constitutional home rule would not be desirable. It
is considered unsound in principle, at least, insofar as applied to
cities of modest size. The idea, at best, is useful in states containing large metropolitan communities, which present complex
regional problems.
b. There is no serious objection to legislative home rule
for West Virginia cities. The proposed constitutional amendment,
however, should be redrafted in behalf of clarity before being subtnifted to the people, if ever it should reach that point.
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